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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
WILFRED A. ROGALSKI, 
. Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. No. 7982 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 1 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from a judgment on a verdict for 
$6,212.50 recovered by plaintiff for personal injuries. On Jan-
!! · uary 18, 1952, plaintiff's employer, Parley Droubay, instructed 
:i plaintiff to drive one of Droubay' s tanker trucks onto a cement 
platform on defendant's premises at Woods Cross, Utah, and 
to steamclean the undercarriage of said truck. Droubay had 
previously been refused permission by defendant's officials 
to use cement platform for washing his trucks. Plaintiff alleged 
in. his complaint that he and his employer, Droubay, were 
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• 
"business invitees," although the place where the injury to 
plaintiff occurred was entirely outside the area where plaintiff 
and his employer transacted any business with defendant. 
Defendant by answer denied that plaintiff and his em-
ployer were business invitees, and alleged that the injuries were 
sustained solely by reason of plaintiff's negligence. The evi-
dence showed that plaintiff operated the steamcleaner, and 
directed a charge of steam downward in such a manner that 
his vision was completely obscured, and while his vision was 
so obscured by the steam by reason of the manner in which 
plaintiff operated the equipment, and without turning the 
nozzle up or away and without waiting for the steam to clear 
away, the plaintiff walked around the front of the truck off 
the cement platform, stepped into a tank of caustic soda, 
the side of which tank was 14 inches above the level 
of the concrete washing platform. Plaintiff suffered chemical 
burns to his leg. A lid was and is hinged to the caustic soda 
tank, which, when down, covers the tank. The caustic soda 
is used by defendant for cleaning certain chemical pump 
equipment parts. Plaintiff admitted that at no time did he pay 
any attention to said tank, and he made no observations with 
respect to it as he drove the truck onto the platform. There 
is no evidence as to who raised the cover lid of the tank on 
the day in question, and as far as the evidence shows, the only 
persons who were around there were plaintiff and his em· 
ployee, Parley Droubay. 
The trial court refused defendant's request to make the 
State Insurance Fund a party to the action, although plaintiff 
was paid compensation for the injury. The court excluded 
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t: 
I 
evidence of plaintiff's admissions made on deposition which 
showed that plaintiff could have seen the tank and avoided 
stepping off the platform over into the tank if he had turned 
the steam nozzle up instead of downward. The court denied 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict of no cause of action. 
Such motion 'vas predicated upon the theory that plaintiff 
was guilty of negligence which as a matter of law precluded 
recovery, for the reason that (a) there was no evidence that 
either plaintiff or his employer was a business invitee at the 
place on defendant's property where the injury occurred, 
(b) there was no evidence that defendant's officers or em-
ployees had lifted the lid of the caustic soda tank, and (c) 
the evidence conclusively showed that the injury was caused 
solely by the reckless conduct of plaintiff in moving toward 
the tank when his vision was totally obscured from the steam 
by reason of the manner in which plaintiff operated the equip-
ment. The court submitted the case to the jury on plaintiff's 
theory that plaintiff was a business guest, and refused to submit 
the case to the jury with ~ppropriate instructions as to de-
fendant's theory that plaintiff was not a business invitee on 
the premises of defendant where the injury ocurred. 
The trial court denied defendant's motion for judgment 
in accordance with the motion for directed verdict, and also 
the alternative motion for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(a) The place where the injury occurred was not a part 
of the premises where plaintiff and his employer were business 
invitees. 
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Phillips Petroleum Company, defendant and appellant, 
has a petroleum products loading plant located at the south-
east corner of Firth North and Onion Streets in Woods Cross, 
Utah. At the west end of the property there is a loading rack 
consisting of pumps from which pertoleum products of de-
fendant are diverted into tankers. Plaintiff's employer, Parley 
Droubay, was and is an independent business operator engag-
ing in the distribution of Phillips petroleum products, under 
an express written contract. Doubray owned tankers, into 
which he or his employees loaded Phillips products at the mar-
keting facility. 
Several hundred feet to the east of the loading rack i~ a 
garage building, part of which was used by defendant, and 
other portions were leased to Droubay under written lease, 
and another portion was ·leased as a custom garage to one 
Mitchell. The premises leased to Droubay are specifically de-
scribed in the lease. Those leased premises did not include 
any portion of the premises where the accident occurred, nor 
the loading area where Droubay and his· employees obtained 
petroleum products. 
The premises where the accident occurred on January 18, 
1952, were never included in the lease to Droubay, nor ever used 
for loading any petroleum products into Droubay's trucks 
or tankers (R. 150). There is no evidence that any business 
whatsoever was ever transacted between Droubay and the de-
fendant in that particular area. Adjacent to the portion of the 
garage building used by defendant and not leased to others, 
there is a cement slab 13 feet 11 inches in width and 51 feet 
4 inches in length (R. 101). There is a drain located approxi· 
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mately in the center of the slab (R. 101). The steam-cleaning 
equipment was located on the north wall. On the east of the 
concrete slab or platform, there is a large garage door leading 
to garage and warehouse facilities of defendant. There was 
and is no covering for this concrete washing platform. 
On the south of the concrete platform, entirely off such 
t.. slab, 2 inches south of the slab, 20 inches from the east wall 
of the garage, there was and is a metal tank containing caustic 
soda. The tank is 5 feet 11 inches in length, and extends 14% 
inches above the level of th concrete slab (R. 38). There was 
and is a lid fastened on hinges (R. 65). The cover has always 
been down when the vat or tank was not in use, as far as 
Droubay had observed (R. 77). The caustic soda is used for 
cleaning equipment parts (R. 76). Neither Droubay nor 
plaintiff saw any Phillips employees around or near the tank 
on January 18, 1952, the date of the accident (R. 77, 108, 
114, 172-173). 
:: 
Neither the washing platform nor the adjacent caustic 
soda tank has ever been leased to anyone. Droubay had at-
tempted to obtain written permission for the use of the washing 
platform, but such use had never been granted (R. 92) . He 
did not claim any right to go onto that concrete slab to wash 
trucks (R. 87). He had previously ~sked for permission, but 
he was "generally just put off" (R. 86). The written agree-
ments he had did not include the right to use said facilities. 
,, , None of the company officials had ever authorized him to 
utilize the washing facilities and had refused him such right. 
Droubay, a former employee of defendant, had washed his 
trucks there at times prior to the day in question. He had 
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"usually checked with the people in the maintenance to see 
if they were going to be using it, or if I was going to be in 
anybody's way." He had no arrangements for going onto the 
slab, and he regarded his use of it as a matter of "neighborly 
accommodation (R. 86-87). Permission had neither been 
granted nor denied (R. 87). On the day of the accident, he 
had no recollection of having made any inquiry of anyone 
as to whether defendant would be using the washing platform 
(R. 87). 
(b) Defendant's employees did not participate rn the 
acts which produced the injuries to plaintiff. 
By answers to the written interrogatories, plaintiff claif!led 
that defendant's alleged negligence consisted of the following: 
"14. No warning signs, directions, or instructions 
provided; no cover over the vat; vat placed too close 
to steam cleaning equipment; no proper protection or 
barricades around vat for person working in vicinity; 
insufficient visibility provided when steam hose in use." 
Plaintiff made no claim that defendant or any of defend-
ant's employees were actively negligent in some manner which 
'ontributed to the injury of plaintiff. Plaintiff relied on the 
claim that he and his employer were business invitees at the 
place where the accident occurred. Plaintiff produced no evi-
dence that the cover lid for the caustic soda tank was raised 
by any of defendant's employees on the day of the eccident. 
There was no evidence that the tank was in use by defendant 
on the day of the plaintiff's injury. In fact, neither Droubay 
nor plaintiff noticed any of the defendant's employees in the 
immediate vicinity of the concrete platform on January 18, 
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1952 (R. 77, 108, 114, 172). Neither Droubay nor plain-
tiff paid any attention to the caustic soda tank, nor made any 
observation as to whether the cover lid was up or down at any 
time prior to the accident ( R. 114, 160) . 
Defendant neither turned on the steam, nor operated 
the equipment, nor placed the trailer truck on the washing 
platform. Plaintiff himself drove the truck onto the platform. 
Plaintiff's employer, Parley Droubay, was the person who 
turned on the steam cleaner, placed the soap on it, and placed 
the equipment in operation (R. 68-69). Droubay cleaned a 
portion of the left side of the undercarriage of the truck, 
showing plaintiff how to use the equipment. Droubay then 
turned the steam hose over to the plaintiff, leaving plaintiff 
entirely alone until after the accident occurred (R. 70-71). · 
(c) Failure to see the caustic soda tank was originally due 
to plaintiff's lack of observation of what was clearly visible, 
and subsequently due to lack of visibility created by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff had never been on the concrete platform prior 
to the day of the accident. At the direction of Parley Droubay, 
plaintiff drove Truck No. 18 onto the "concrete ramp," keep-
ing it as far from the windows and wall as possible to avoid 
splashing the wall and windows with grease and water (R. 
124-125). He drove the truck in a position so as to stay on the 
slab with the right wheels. At the trial he estimated that he 
drove the truck to a point within 3 feet from the garage door 
located at the east end of the concrete washing platform, 
whereas on deposition he testified the distance was about 6 
feet (R. 125, 159). Droubay estimated that the front of the 
truck was parallel with the west edge of the caustic soda 
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tank (R. 102). Droubay estimated that the right wheels of 
the truck were about 20 inches north of the south edge of 
the concrete slab (R. 102). 
Prior to the date of the accident, plaintiff had merely 
seen the concrete platform and surroundings from a distance of 
about 125 feet (R. 151). No one had ever told him that there 
was a caustic soda tank adjacent to the washing platform. 
When he drove onto the platform, he did not see the tank. 
He testified that "if I had of I wouldn't have paid much atten-
tion to it" because "there is always a lot of different tanks 
and metal containers they have in this vicinity here" (R. 127). 
In examining his own photograph, Exhibit "A," plaintiff ad-
mitted that he could see the caustic soda tank, and that the 
same was plainly visible in approaching the concrete slab (R. 
154) . As he drove onto the concrete platform he was paying 
more attention to the left wall and windows. He knew there 
were objects to his right, a collection of tanks and high-boys, 
but he did not pay too much attention to objects on his right. 
He stayed about 5 feet away from the north wall of the build-
ing (R. 155). He testified, "I tried to stay as far away from 
the building as I could and still clear the objects on the right 
hand side and not scrape the fender." He knew he had to 
stay away from the objects on the right side to get around 
with the steam cleaning equipment (R. 156). The steam-
cleaner nozzle is about ;. or 4 feet from the end of the hose 
to the tip of the nozzle (R. 1)7). There were no objects on 
the concrete platform other than the steam-cleaning equip· 
ment. He had an unobstructed path when he drove onto the 
platform, and he did not have to move any objects (R. '159). 
10 
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As plaintiff drove onto the platform, he did not observe 
whether the lid cover of the caustic soda tank was up or down 
(R. 160). He thought there were objects within a foot of the 
concrete platform (R. 161), but he admitted that he testified 
on deposition that there were no objects on the concrete plat-
form except the steam cleaner, and that the objects such as 
barrels which he claimed obstructed his view were 4 or 5 
feet away from the concrete paltform (R. 162-163). 
Plaintiff got out of the cab, and Parley Droubay showed 
him how to steam-dean the undercarriage (R. 164). Plaintiff 
then started to use the steam-cleaner. Plaintiff directed the 
steam where he wanted it, and moved the nozzle to examine 
the part to which he had previously applied the steam (R. 
165-166): 
"Q. When you started to clean around in the front 
. of the truck, how could you tell whether or not the 
part you had been cleaning, or the undercarriage had 
been sufficiently cleaned? 
"A. I knew if I waited a minute the steam would 
clear, and put steam on it again and more or less take 
it for granted the last dose I had given enough to 
have it cleaned. 
"Q. As you handled this nozzle you directed this 
nozzle to the under-carriage, you turned it to one side, 
you turned the steam nozzle away and looked at the 
part you were working on? 
"A. Some of the time turned it up in the air and 
waited for the steam to disappear." 
Plaintiff tried "to walk around the side of the truck" as 
far as he could get "over by the cab door, to wash the outside 
11 
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of the right front wheel" when his left foot hit the north wall 
of the tank of caustic soda, and he raised his foot up over the 
Y.rall and stepped into the tank. The visibility was so poor "on 
account of the steam, I never saw, or noticed any vat being 
there." He held the steam nozzle "straight in front of me, 
to my left, a little," his hand being about 2 feet from the 
end of the nozzle. The steam was on the entire period of time 
(R. 166-168). The steam was so dense that it was "difficult 
to see where I was going, very difficult (R. 166). There was 
so much steam coming out in front of the truck that he could 
not see. It was so foggy he could not see his hand in front 
of his face (R. 13 3) . Explaining how he stepped over the 
wall of the caustic soda tank, he testified (R. 168): 
"A. I touched it with my foot, and as I sort of 
stumbled I tried to raise my foot up, to catch my bal-
ance, therefore, I accidentally stepped into the tank, 
trying to keep my balance, with my right elbow on the 
fender, trying to hold myself as I moved forward." 
The trial court denied the defendant's offer to show 
that on deposition plaintiff admitted that he could easily see 
where he was going if he turned the steam nozzle to one side 
and up instead of turning it down (R. 170-172). 
Plaintiff admitted that Exhibit 9 as a photograph of a 
steam-cleaner nozzle is similar to the one he used (R. 176). 
Plaintiff had control over the steam-nozzle the entire time 
he was using it (R. 177-178). 
When plaintiff stepped into the tank of caustic soda, he 
yelled, ran into the wash room and was given assistance by 
his employer and taken to the hospital. The court excluded 
12 
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the offered evidence that he was paid workmen's compensa-
tion, and recovered sufficiently to return to work when com-
pensation settlement was made. 
Defendant offered evidence showing that Parley Droubay 
prior to January 18, 1952, requested written permission to 
use the washing rack, and to share the use with defendant; 
and that he was advised that the only privileges he had were 
those set forth in the \vritten contracts and lease, and that 
Lloyd Clyde McDonnell, to whom application was made, was 
unable to grant such permission (R. 199-200). 
The trial judge declined to hear argument on the motion 
for . dismissal or the motion for directed verdict of no cause 
of action, and submitted the case to the jury. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON FOR REVERSAL 
OF THE JUDGMENT 
1. The case should not have been submitted to the jury, 
for defendant violated no duty of care to plaintiff. 
2. Plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law 
which would preclude recovery in any event. 
3. The court erred in the exclusion of evidence. 
4. The court erred in its charge to the jury, by erroneous 
instructions and by refusal to submit instructions on defendant's 
theory. 
5. The State Insurance Fund was a necessary party. 
13 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
THE CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED 
TO- THE JURY, FOR DEFENDANT VIOLATED NO 
DUTY OF CARE TO PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff filed suit on the theory that he was a business 
invitee on defendant's premises, and that defendant was negli-
gent by failing to keep the premises in a safe condition, par-
ticularly by keeping and maintaining a tank of caustic soda 
adjacent to a concrete washing platform (R. 1). The de-
fendant denied that plaintiff was a business invitee on the par-
ticular premises where the accident occurred, and the evidence 
shows that the place where plaintiff's employer transacted 
business with the defendant by loading petroleum products 
into trucks and tankers is an area at least 100 feet from the 
concrete platform and 150 feet from the caustic tank south 
of that platform. As pointed out hereinafter in a discussion 
of the error in the submission of the case to the jury, the trial 
court assumed that if plaintiff was a business invitee on 
some portion of the real property of defendant, that business 
invitation extended to all of defendant's property. 
The place where the injury occurred was at least 150 feet 
distant from the eastern portion of the marketing facility: No 
petroleum products were loaded by Droubay or his employees 
at or adjacent to the place where the injury occurred. Droubay 
had a right to use certain portions of the defendant's premises 
by express written agreements. He admitted that he claimed 
no right to use the washing platform, and that he had made no 
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arrangements for its use. He had requested written permis-
sion from defendant's officials to use the washing platform, 
but he was never given such permission-"generally just put 
off" (R. 86-87). Droubay washed his trucks once every sixty 
days, a,nd it cost him money when he had his trucks washed 
at Wagstaff's (R. 108, 92). Droubay never offered to pay 
any money for the use of the defendant's washing facilities 
(R. 92). He had tried to make some arrangements , for the 
use of said washing platform and a grease rack, but per-
mission had never been granted (R. 92) . Before using the 
washing platform, he generally asked someone in the main-
tenance department of defendant corporation whether defend-
ant would be using it of if he would be in the way (R. 86). 
He regarded the matter of using those facilities as a matter 
of neighborly accommodation (R. 87). On the day of the 
· accident he did not recall having asked anyone about it (R. 87). 
There is not a scintilla of evidence that Droubay was 
invited to use the washing platform and the steam-cleaning 
equipment, either by implication or otherwise. Plaintiff was 
not a business invitee of defendant. He was an employee of 
Drol,lbay. The injury occurred at a place entirely outside 
the place where any business was transacted, and more than 
150 feet away. 
The accident did not occur by reason of some acts of de-
fendant's employees. The plaintiff's employer turned on the 
steam-cleaning equipment, and turned the use of it over to 
plaintiff after plaintiff had driven the truck onto the cement 
platform. Plaintiff paid no attention to his surroundings 
other than to observe that there were no employees of defendant 
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around. None of the defendant's employees did any of the acts 
which produced the injury. Thre was no active negligence on 
the part of defendant, and plaintiff claimed none. The only 
negligence claimed by plaintiff on the part of defendant was: 
'' 14. No warning sign, directions, or instructions 
provided; no cover over the vat; vat placed too close 
to steam cleaning equipment; no proper protection or 
barricades around vat for person working in vicinity; 
insufficient visibility when steam hose in use." 
Under plaintiff's theory, defendant had an obligation to 
place warning signs, directions or instructions but since plain-
tiff created so ·much steam-fog by the way he operated the 
steam-cleaner, the signs would not have been visible to him 
anyway. In view of the admission of plaintiff that even if he 
had seen the tank he "wouldn't have paid much attention to 
it" (R. 127), it is difficult to see what good such warnings 
would have been. Furthermore, there was a lid for the tank. 
Obviously it was a lid which could be raised so that the tank 
could be used by defendant. The claim that defendant ·failed 
to provide a cover is not supported by the evidence, for the 
proof shows there was always a cover lid attached to the tank. 
The proof is also that the cover-lid was down when not in 
use, as far as Droubay was able to observe (R. 77). There 
is no proof whatsoever, that any of defendant's employees 
raised the cover lid of the tank on the day of the accident. 
In fact, when Droubay and plaintiff came onto the washing 
platform, they did not pay any attention to the tank and did 
not observe whether the lid was up or down (R. 114. 127, 
160). Neither Droubay nor plaintiff saw any employees of the 
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defendant working in that immediate vicinity on the day of 
the accident (R. 77, 108, 114, 172-173). 
The claim that the caustic soda tank was "too close to 
the steam-cleaning equipment" is patently absurd, for it was 
entirely off the concrete platform in a position where defend-
ant could use it. It was not located where it would obstruct 
movement on the concrete platform. In fact, there were no 
obstructions of any kind on the platform. Likewise, the con-
tention that defendant was negligent by not having "proper 
protection or barricades around the vat for persons working 
in the vicinity," is also unsound; for if the tank had been bar-
ricaded sufficiently to keep plaintiff from stepping into the 
tank, the plaintiff would likely have suffered a worse injury 
by running into the barricade while moving around in· a fog 
of steam which he had created by his own reckless indifference 
for his own safety. It would be utterly impossible to have in-
sured the safety of plaintiff under the circumstances. 
Furthermore, the claim that defendant was negligent be-
cause of "insufficient visibility when steam hose in use," dis-
regards the fact that plaintiff's employer turned on the steam, 
and plaintiff created the condition of lack of sufficient visi-
bility of which he complains. All of the conditions of alleged 
invisibility were due solely to the affirmative acts and omis-
sions of the plaintiff. He had control of the situation, whether 
there would be a cloud of steam in front of him or not. There 
is nothing in the record which even hints that defendant knew 
that plaintiff was present at the place in question. 
If plaintiff was not a trespasser, at best he was a mere 
licensee. He was on the portion of defendant's property to 
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do a job for his employer, Parley Droubay. He was in no sense 
a business invitee on either the washing platform of defendant, 
nor in the caustic soda tank. 
The development of the distinction in liability of a pos· 
sessor of land toward a business invitee and bare licensee and 
a trespasser is discussed in the Annotation 49 A.L.R. 778 
and supplemented at 156 A.L.R. 1226. The terminology used 
in the A.L.R. Annotation is "active negligence" in the liability 
toward licensees and trespassers and "passive negligence" in 
the case of business invitees. An application of the distinction 
is Morrison v. ·Rutledge Co., (1922) 20 App. Div. 636, 193 
N.Y. Supp. 428, where the evidence showed that the defendant 
discharged the plaintiff but plaintiff was permitted to remain 
in the hotel for the night. On the following morning she fell 
and suffered injuries because of a cake of soap on a stairway. 
She fell on her way to get utensils belonging to her and used 
by her in her work. The court said: 
"Assuming that she was a licensee, then this de-
fendant owed to her the duty not to injure her by an 
active negligence. This court so held in the case of 
Lande v. L. & S. Constr. Co. (1920) 191 App. Div. 
497, 181 N. Y. Supp. 493, and the same rule has 
been stated in the court of appeals in the case of Walsh 
v. Fritchburg R. Co. ( 1895) 145 N.Y. 306, 27 L.R.A. 
724, 45 Am. St. Rep. 615, 39 N.E. 1068. As to a tres-
paser or licensee, the defendant owed no active vigi-
lance, nor was the defendant liable for any passive 
negligence in failing to keep the premises in good re-
pair; but for active negligence the defendant was 
liable under the authorities cited.'' 
In Weitzmann v. A. L. Barber Asphalt Co. (1908), 190 
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N.Y. 452, 123 Am. St. Rep. 560, 83 N.E. 477, plaintiff was 
injured by a barrel attached to a cable. The trial court had 
charged the jury that the barrel was more in the nature of a 
projectile fired from a gun or instrument which suddenly shot 
across the premises, than where there was a stationary danger. 
The Appellate Court said in reversing a judgment for the 
plaintiff: 
"The defendant had the undoubted right to main-
tain the apparatus in question on its property, and 
while it was probably much more dangerous than sta-
tionary machinery, we do not think that circumstance 
altered the rule with respect to its liability towards mere 
trespassers or bare licensees. As to such persons the 
well-settled rule is that the only duty of the owners 
or occupiers of the land is to abstain from inflicting 
intentional, wanton, or wilful injuries." 
In Rosado v. Perch Realty Corporation ( 1933), 239 App. 
Div. 373, 267 N.Y. Supp. 561, the court stated: 
"It is the etsablished law in this state that the only 
duty owed to a mere licensee by the owner of the 
premises upon which he is injured is to refrain from 
inflicting intentional, wanton, or wilful injury. In 
short, in order to render the owner liable for injuries 
sustained by. a bare licensee as the result of a defect 
in the premises where he was in jured, there must be 
some act of active negligence on the part of the owner. 
The owner cannot be held liabile in damages for fail-
ure to keep its premises in repair." 
The same doctrine was applied in Paquet v. Barker ( 193·7) 
250 App. Div. 771, 293 N.Y. Supp. 983, where the court said: 
"As a matter of law the deceased was either a tres-
passer or a bare licensee. If he was a trespasser, the 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appellant owed to him no duty except that of refrain-
ing from intentionally or wantonly injuring him; if 
he was a bare licensee, the appellant owed him no duty 
to exercise care that the premises were safe for the 
licensee, who, in entering by permission, took the risk 
of their condition. To such licensee, however, the ap-
pellant owed the duty of refraining from affirmative 
acts of negligence that might injure the former." 
And in Dunn v. Bomberger ( 1938) 213 N.C. 172, 195 
S.E. 364, the court said: 
"The only duty resting upon the defendant was to 
refrain from wilful or wanton negligence, and from the 
commission of any act which would increase the haz-
ard. The owner of land is not required to keep his 
premises in a suitable or safe condition for those who 
come there solely as licensees and who are not either 
expressly invited to enter or induced to come upon them 
for the purpose for which the premises are appropriated 
and occupied. In authoritative decisions of this and 
other jurisdictions, the degree of care to be exercised 
by the owner of premises toward a person coming upon 
the premises as a bare or permissive licensee for his 
own convenience is to refrain from wilful or wanton 
negligence and from doing any act which increases 
the hazard to the licensee while he is upon the prem-
ises. The owner is not liable for injuries resulting to 
a licensee from defects, obstacles, or pitfalls upon the 
premises, unless the owner is affirmatively and actively 
negligent in respect to such defect, obstacle, or pitfall 
while the licensee is upon his premises, resulting in 
increased hazard and danger to the licensee." (Em-
phasis ours) . 
The Restatement makes the same distinction. (Restate-
ment on Torts, Volume II, § 342, is as follows: 
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"A possessor of land owes to a gratuitous licensee 
no duty to prepare a safe place for the licensee's re-
ception or to inspect the land to discover possible or 
even probable dangers. 
"If the license is gratuitous, the privilege to enter 
is a gift and the licensee, as the recipient thereof, is 
entitled to expect nothing more than a disclosure of 
the conditions which he will meet if he acts upon the 
license and enters, in so far as those conditions are 
known to the giver of the privilege." (Emphasis ours.) 
In the case at bar no invitation was issued to the plain-
tiff. The sole business of the plaintiff upon defendant's prem-
ises was his own and that of his employer. There was no evi-
dence from which the jury could conclude that plaintiff was 
a business invitee within the meaning of the Authorities. De-
fendant owed no duty to plaintiff except to disclose to him any 
known defects or dangerous conditions. There was no evi-
dence to the effect that any employe or official of the defendant 
corporation had any knowledge that the lid was not on the 
vat, nor was there any evidence to the effect that any employe 
or official knew or had reason to believe that plaintiff was 
going to enter the premises to use the wash rack upon the day 
of the accident. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in failing 
to grant defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that 
no negligence or other breach of duty toward plaintiff was 
shown and that the court erred further in permitting the jury 
to conclude that the plaintiff was a business invitee upon de-
fendant's premises. 
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POINT NO.2 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE RE-
COVERY IN ANY·EVENT. 
Defendant did not turn on the steam which blinded 
plaintiff, nor did it do anything to obscure his view. Plaintiff's 
employer turned on the steam, and plaintiff had control of the 
steam nozzle, and he created the steam cloud of which he 
complains. He had a clear view of the entire cement platform 
as he drove the truck onto it. There were no obstructions. He 
could have seen the tank of caustic soda if he had looked. He 
said he would not have paid much attention to it even if he 
had seen it because of other metal tanks and barrels (R. 127). 
His failure to see was due to his own indisposition to look at 
what was plainly visible, as shown by Exhibit "A." Exhibits 
"B," "C," and "D" clearly show that the tank was in a position 
entirely off the concrete platform. It did not obstruct move-
ment on the platform. 
Plaintiff testified that he stepped over the side of the 
metal tank, which side is 14 inches above the concrete slab, 
and into the tank, because he cauld not see where he was going. 
The only reason he could not see was because he held the 
steam nozzle out in front of him, and downward. The steam 
fog was of his own creation. The steam was so dense that he 
could not see his hand in front of his face (R. 133). Yet, he 
tried to move around the front of the truck blindly. He was 
reckless in holding the steam hose in front and downward, 
which obscured his view of what was in front of him. He could 
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have turned the nozzle up or to one side and thus have per-
mitted the steam to float away and to see where the steam 
cloud had been. He had sole control of the direction of the 
steam, and it was within his own power to wait until the 
steam cleared so that he could see (R. 132, 133, 165-166). He 
testified that as he came across the front axle and started 
to clean on the right side, he started over toward the door and 
to walk around the fender when his foot came in contact with 
the metal tank which was not visible to him because of the 
steam. In trying to get his balance he placed his arm on the 
fender, and stepped over into the tank with his left foot (R. 
131-133, 164-168, 177-178). 
There was nothing which could have prevented seeing the 
tank except the steam fog which he created. He wilfully went 
forward knowing he could not see, and knowing also that he 
could see if he would turn the nozzle up and to one side. He 
was wantonly reckless in failing to follow a few simple rules 
of care for his own safety. 
As a matter of law plaintiff was negligent in failing to 
see the vat, or if he saw it he was negligent in stumbling into 
it. It is clear that he was negligent in using the steam hose 
in such a manner as prevented him from seemg what was 
plain to be seen. If he did not see the vat but stepped in a 
direction where he had no visibility, being unacquainted with 
the premises, his negligence consisted of failing to exercise 
ordinary precautions for his own safety in walking into an 
area without knowing that it was reasonably safe. 
Taking a degree of care beyond any duty owed plaintiff 
by defendant a number of cases have held that a business 
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invitee walking into a portion of the premises with which he is 
not familiar, without endeavoring to ascertain the existence 
of defects in the premises, or other dangerous conditions which 
he may encounter beyond the door, is guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. 
In Tutwiler v. Beverally Nalle, Inc., ( 1943·) 152 Fla. 
479, 12 So. (2d) 163, plaintiff was a prospective tenant in-
specting the premises in an apartment house owned by de-
fendant. A stairway was constructed to the left of the hallway, 
which led from the living room of the apartment to the 
kitchen, with a door beneath the stairway. The door opened 
unwarningly upon a flight of stairs to the cellar. The floor 
level of the hall did not extend beyond the door, there being 
a stone drop from the level of the passageway or hall to the 
first step of the stairway. The stairway was dark, precipitous 
and unlighted. There was evidence that the door had the ap-
pearance of an entrance into a closet rather than an entrance 
into a cellar. Plaintiff had no knowledge of the condition of 
the apartment: She opened the door and fell down the stairway 
into the cellar. The court held that plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law. When she opened 
the door to the cellar and was unable to see what was beyond 
she failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety by 
taking a step forward into a dark and unlighted stairway. 
In Bruce v. Risley, ( 1936) 15 Cal. App. (2d) 659, 59 
P. (2d) 847, plaintiff was a prospective tenant. The accident 
occured in substantially the same manner as in Tutwiler v. T. 
Beverally Nalle, Inc. Plaintiff and another man proceeded to 
the rear of the room, opened up a door which led to a base-
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ment stairway platform and plaintiff proceeded along the 
platform, striking paper matches to light his way. Plaintiff 
fell down the steps into the basement. The court stated that 
the impenetrable darkness which surrounded the stair land-
ing was of itself a sufficient warning to plaintiff that if he 
proceeded through the doorway without sufficient light to 
enable him to see what lay beyond he would do so at his 
own risk. 
In Murphy v. Cohen, ( 1916) 223 Mass. 54, 111 N. E. 
771, plaintiff, a real estate agent, was showing a prospective 
tenant through the house and fell on unfamiliar cellar steps 
so dimly lighted that the width of the treads was scarcely 
visible. The court held that he was negligent as a matter of 
law in proceeding into an unlighted area. The New York 
court held in Van Ness v. Murphy, {1907} 56 Misc. 556, 
107 N.Y. Supp. 99, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law, when she had recently rented 
an apartment and entered a dark hallway, deliberately opened 
and walked through the first door she saw without ascertain-
ing that the doorway entered into a stairway to the cellar. 
The court said that there was no presumption that a person 
can walk through any door he comes to in a strange house 
without taking precautionary measures, and in Rowell vs. John 
Huztler Lumber Co., {1930} 228 App. Div. 158, 239 N. Y. 
Supp. 192, affirmed 1930, 255 N.Y. 581, 175 N.E. 322, plaintiff, 
a prospective purchaser, opened and passed through a door 
marked "Private." The door opened from the staircase and 
the stairs were in complete darkness. The court said "She 
was not precipitated down the stairs by anything giving way; 
She intentionally pushed the door open, knowing that it 
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swung away from her; she then voluntarily stepped into an 
unknown space in a strange building without taking any pre-
caution for her safety." Substantially the same factual situation 
existed in Boyce v. Brewington (1945) 49 N. Mex. 107, 158 
P. (2d) 124, 163 A.L.R. 583. The court stated the rule with 
respect to the duty owed a business invitee. It concluded that: 
"The failure of the plaintiff to exercise ordinary case for her 
own safety when opening a closed door and taking a step for-
ward into an unlighted stairway, thereby contributing to her 
own injury as a matter of law, will preclude recovery on her part 
under the evidence in this case, and it was error for the trial 
court to refuse to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant." 
The same rule frequently has been applied where the 
plaintiff was a guest, or prospective guest, of a hotel or a 
tenant of an apartment house, other than a dwelling place. 
In Hooker v. Route Realty Co., (1938) 102 Colo. 8, 76 P. 
(2d) 431, plaintiff was attempting to make a social call on 
a friend who was a resident of a hotel. Instead of entering the 
front entrance plaintiff chose a dark, dingy area, unfamiliar 
to her, located in the rear of the hotel. In Hart v. Sullivan, 
(1944), 323 Ill. App. 243, 58 N.E. (2d) 301, plaintiff pro-
ceeded up an unlighted stairway to meet someone who occupied 
an apartment in the building. The only light was a match 
plaintiff was using and it was extinguished before he reached 
the stairway landing. Plaintiff opened the door leading off the 
landing and fell down another stairway leading to the base-
ment. He was held to have been contributorily negligent as a 
matter of law. In Campbell v.Abbott (1900), 176 Mass. 246,57 
N.E. 462, plaintiff had never before been in the building. He 
entered without knocking or ringing a bell and found himself 
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in darkness. Instead of attempting to attract attention from 
the family he endeavored to find his own way. In so doing 
he fell down the cellar steps. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Court held he was negligent as a matter of law. The same 
rule was applied in Freirson v. Mutual Realty Co. ( 1934), 48 
Ga. App. 839, 174 S.E. 144, and in Baumler v. Wilm, (1910) 
136 App. Div. 857, 122 N.Y. Supp. 98. Hilsenbeck v. Guhring, 
(1892) 131 N.Y. 674, 30 N.E. 580, applied the same rule to 
substantially similar facts. Plaintiff had never before been 
in the apartment house. He opened a door believing he was 
entering a closet but in fact he entered a short dark hallway 
leading to the basement. Plaintiff had testified that ··it was 
dark and after he got hold of the door in question it was so 
dark he could not see in the space in front of him. He had 
never been there before, and he had no information which 
might lead him or cause him to think there was but one and 
that the door led into the closet. He knew nothing about it 
and in that state of ignorance he opens the door which he 
thought was the one leading to the closet, but, it being dark, 
he could not be certain, and, notwithstanding the darkness, 
he walks ahead and, while supposing himself in the closet, 
steps into the heading of the stairway and falls down the 
cellar stairs." The court said that the plaintiff could not walk 
through a door in darkness into a hallway with which he 
was unfamiliar and then claim damages for the resulting 
injury. 
To the same effect see Sauter v. Hinde, (1913) 183 Ill. 
App. 413; Benton v. Watson, ( 1919) 231 Mass. 582, 121 
N.E. 399; DuRocher v. Teutonia Motor Car Co. (1925), 188 
Wis. 208, 205 N.W. 921, 42 A.L.R. 1094; National Refining 
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Co. v. Strichmaker, (1934) 49 Ohio App. 467, 197 N.E. 
364; Heidenrich v. Dumas, (1937) 88 N.H. 453, 190 Atl. 
705; Wesbrock v. Colby, bzc., (1942) 315 Ill. App. 494, 
43 N.E. (2d) 405; Sat'tori v. Capitol City Lodge (1942), 212 
Minn. 538, 4 N.W. (2d) 339; Hudson v. Church of Holy 
Trinity (1929), 250 N.Y. 513, 199 N.E. 603; McVeagh v. 
Bass (1933) 110 Pa. Sup. Ct. 379, 171 Atl. 486; Brusseau 
v. Selmo '(1938) 286 Mich. 171, 281 N.W. 580. 
In Erickson v. McKay (1932) 207 Wis. 497, 242 N.W. 
133, plaintiff went around to the rear of the building in an 
area which he had never been before and fell into a ramp 
leading down into the basement. He was held to be contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law. In Plahn v. Masonic Hall 
Bldg. Assn. (1939) 206 Minn. 232, 288 N.W. 575, the court 
placed emphasis upon the fact that plaintiff knew, or should 
have realized, the risks which she took in walking into an 
unlighted area through a door which entered into a stairway 
which led to the cellar. Plaintiff here was in search of a toilet 
and the court held that she appreciated the risks involved 
and that her lack of knowledge of the area exposed plaintiff 
to danger. 
In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Sanderson ( 1917) 175 
Ky. 11, 192 S.W. 869, L.R.A. 1917D 890, the Court of Appeals 
of Kentucky applied the rule, although plaintiff had been in 
the area where the accident occurred before three times, plain-
tiff in this case hurriedly purchased a railroad ticket and pro-
ceeded through a partially opened and unmarked door in the 
waiting room. The court stated in its opinion that to bolt 
headlong into a dark and unknown place, without stopping 
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IZ 
to determine whether it is safe to proceed, is an act of reck-
lessness about which reasonable minds could not well differ. 
The trial court should have directed a verdict for defendant. 
The rule was applied in England in Wilkinson v. Frairrie 
(1862), 9 Jur. N.S. 280, where the opinion was written by 
Justice C. B. Pollock. 
The same rule has been applied where the plaintiff fell 
into a furnace pit or other depression rather than down stair-
ways. Huyink v. Hart Publications (1942), 212 Minn. 87, 2 
N.W. (2d) 552; Wentink v. Traphagen (1940) 138 Neb. 
41, 291 N.W. 884; Czesznek v. Rulfy Corporation (1940) 
259 App. Div. 302, 19 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 248; Gasch v. Rounds 
( 1916) 93 Wash. 317, 160 P. 962; Donaldson v. Kemper, 
152 Kan. 533, 106 P. (2d) 1051. 
In Ross v. Becklenberg ( 1917}, 209 Ill. App. 144 and 
DeGralfenried v. Wallace (1899), 2 Ind. Ter. 657, 53 S.W. 
452, plaintiffs had entered into unfinished buildings which 
were unlighted and in which they had never previously been. 
They were held contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
when they fell through unfinished floors. In both instances 
the courts considered plaintiffs to be business invitees. In 
the latter case plaintiff was an attorney who went on to the 
premises to interview his client. 
The rule was applied in the following cases where the 
plaintiffs walked into dark areas and fell into a hole in the 
ground or passageway. Powers v. Raymond, ( 1925), 197 Cal. 
126, 239 P. 1069; Gillespie v. John W. Ferguson & Co., 
(1909) 78 N.J.L. 470, 74 Atl. 460; Costello v. Farmers Bank, 
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Co. v. Strichmaker, (1934) 49 Ohio App. 467, 197 N.E. 
364; Heidenrich v. Dumas, (1937) 88 N.H. 453, 190 Atl. 
705; Wesb1'ock z·. Colby, Inc., (1942) 315 Ill. App. 494, 
43 N.E. (2d) 405; Sartori v. Capitol City Lodge (1942), 212 
Minn. 538, 4 N.W. (2d) 339; Hudson v. Church of Holy 
Trinity (1929), 250 N.Y. 513, 199 N.E. 603; McVeagh t'. 
Bass (1933) 110 Pa. Sup. Ct. 379, 171 Atl. 486; Brusseau 
v. Selma·( 1938) 286 Mich. 171, 281 N.W. 580. 
In Erickson v. McKay (1932) 207 Wis. 497, 242 N.W. 
133, plaintiff went around to the rear of the building in an 
area which he had never been before and fell into a ramp 
leading down into the basement. He was held to be contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law. In Plahn v. Masonic Hall 
Bldg. Assn. (1939) 206 Minn. 232, 288 N.W. 575, the court 
placed emphasis upon the fact that plaintiff knew, or should 
have realized, the risks which she took in walking into an 
unlighted area through a door which entered into a stairway 
which led to the cellar. Plaintiff here was in search of a toilet 
and the court held that she appreciated the risks involved 
and that her lack of knowledge of the area exposed plaintiff 
to danger. 
In Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Sanderson ( 1917) 175 
Ky. 11, 192 S.W. 869, L.R.A. 19170 890, the Court of Appeals 
of Kentucky applied the rule, although plaintiff had been in 
the area where the accident occurred before three times, plain-
tiff in this case hurriedly purchased a railroad ticket and pro-
ceeded through a partially opened and unmarked door in the 
waiting room. The court stated in its opinion that to bolt 
headlong into a dark and unknown place, without stopping 
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to determine whether it is safe to proceed, is an act of reck-
lessness about which reasonable minds could not well differ. 
The trial court should have directed a verdict for defendant. 
The rule was applied in England in Wilkinson v. Frairrie 
(1862), 9 Jur. N.S. 280, ·where the opinion was written by 
Justice C. B. Pollock. 
The same rule has been applied where the plaintiff fell 
into a furnace pit or other depression rather than down stair-
ways. Huyink v. Hart Publications (1942), 212 Minn. 87, 2 
N.W. (2d) 552; Wentink v. Traphagen (1940) 138 Neb. 
41, 291 N.W. 884; Czesznek v. Ruffy Corporation (1940) 
259 App. Div. 302, 19 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 248; Gasch v. Rounds 
( 1916) 93 Wash. 317, 160 P. 962; Donaldson v. Kemper, 
152 Kan. 533, 106 P. (2d) 1051. 
In Ross v. Becklenberg ( 1917), 209 Ill. App. 144 and 
DeGraffenried v. Wallace (1899), 2 Ind. Ter. 657, 53 S.W. 
452, plaintiffs had entered into unfinished buildings which 
were unlighted and in which they had never previously been. 
They were held contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
when they fell through unfinished floors. In both instances 
the courts considered plaintiffs to be business invitees. In 
the latter case plaintiff was an attorney who went on to the 
premises to interview his client. 
The rule was applied in the following cases where the 
plaintiffs walked into dark areas and fell into a hole in the 
ground or passageway. Powers v. Raymond, ( 1925), 197 Cal. 
126, 239 P. 1069; Gillespie v. John W. Ferguson & Co., 
(1909) 78 N.J.L. 470, 74 Atl. 460; Costello v. Farmers Bank, 
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( 1916) 34 N.D. 131; 157 N.W. 982; Dacus v. Dickinson 
T,-ust Co. (1941), 65 Ga. App. 872, 16 S.E. (2d) 786. 
In at least two cases plaintiffs were invitees in a garage 
or filling station and were held to be contributorily negligent 
in walking through darkness and falling into grease pits. 
Elliott v. Dahl, ( 1941), 299 Mich. 380, 300 N.W. 1~2; Smith 
v. Wiley-Hall Motors (1945) 184 Va. 50, 34 S.E. (2d) 233. 
The Court's attention is invited to the Annotation appear-
ing in 163 A.L.R., beginning at page 593, where these and 
many other cases are discussed. At page 613 of the Annotation 
the editor distinguishes the cases that hold that contributory 
negligence is a question for the jury in situations where plain-
tiff had some knowledge of the premises or the accident 
occurred in a place where the injured person possibly had 
some right to assume that are area was safe or that the injured 
person relied upon the advice or direction of an employe on 
the premises, or that there was not sufficient opportunity to 
discover the danger prior to the accident. 
The case of Moore v. Miles ( 1945) 108 Utah 167, 158 
P. (2d) 676, is not contrary on its facts to the principle an-
nounced in the cases following the majority rule. In the Moore 
case the plaintiff testified that the west end of the hall was 
so dark that she could not see the stairs. She said she was walk-
ing slowly and feeling ahead with her feet that she lost her 
balance at the first step and fell down the short flight of steps 
to the doorway. The night clerk testified that the hallway 
was lighted and that when he stood at the east end of the 
hall he could see the entire length and could see the rooms 
all the way down the hall. The court said: 
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"This conflict in the evi~ence presented a question 
for the jury as to whether the hallway was ·lighted, an 
important element on the question of negligence. 
Olson v. Hayden Holding Company, 92 Utah 551, 70 
P. (2d) 463." 
The court held that where reasonable minds could draw dif-
ferent conclusions from the evidence the question of contribu- · 
tory negligence was for the jury. 
In the case at bar there is no question of inadequate 
lighting. The statute referred to in Moot"e v. Miles is, of 
course, inapplicable here. Conceding that this Court is com-
mitted to the doctrine that questions of p.egligence and con-
tributory negligence allegedly are to be decided by the jury 
under proper instructions, it is respectfully submitted that 
reasonable minds could not conclude that plaintiff Rogalski 
was free ·from contributory negligence. 
It must be kept in mind that the accident occurred in the 
middle of the day. The vat into which plaintiff stumbled was 
not hidden. It was not placed in a position where its detection 
would be difficult. It was in plain view. It was placed in a 
position off the cement apron, in an area which would normally 
not be frequented by any persons except employees of the de-
fendant and persons who had specific permission to enter the 
premises. 
Would this Court say that if a man closed his eyes and 
walked into the side of the building that he was not guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law? Where then 
will the Court draw the line? It it less negligent to stumble 
into a vat in a refinery area than to walk into the side of a 
building? Certainly, the plaintiff had no excuse for not seeing 
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the vat. He simply failed to look and observe what was in 
plain view. If a man is contributorily negligent as a matter 
of law for proceeding into an area insufficiently lighted, then 
a fortiori plaintiff is negligent as a matter of law when he 
stumbles into a vat which is in plain view in the middle of 
the afternoon. This is not a case where plaintiff used a defec-
tive appliance or where he stepped on a covering which was 
not strong enough to hold his weight. It is to be noted that 
the plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent because of 
"insufficient visibility provided when steam hose in use" (R. 
14) . Plaintiff himself held the steam hose in such a manner 
that according to his testimony his vision was obscured. The 
steam which he himself operated and over which he 
exercised dominion, prevented him from seeing the vat. Can 
this Court say that when plaintiff himself, by his own negli-
gence, makes it impossible to see the vat, he is less guilty of 
contributory negligence than if he actually closed his eyes 
and walked into it? 
Moreover, plaintiff was not in the kind of an area in 
which he could reasonably expect to be free from danger. 
He was near a gasoline refinery, an area in which there are 
bound to be some dangerous tools and substances. It does 
not matter, for the purpose of considering plaintiff's negli-
gence, whether the content of the vat was water, gasoline, 
caustic soda or any other substance. Plaintiff is not entitled 
to presume, in the kind of an area in which he was working, 
that any substance in the vat was safe to step into. There is 
no evidence as to what his thoughts were on this subject in 
any event, because he did see the vat before he stepped into it. 
Certainly this Court cannot say that if he had seen the vat he 
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would have stepped into it on a cold day in January, on the 
assumption that its contents were not harmful to him. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred m 
failing to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict 
and in failing to enter a judgment of non-suit at the close of 
plaintiff's evidence. 
The case at bar is substantially identical with the case 
of Knox v. Snow, et al., recently decided by this court. Knox 
t'. Snow, et al, ( 1951) ____ Utah ____ , 229 P. (2d) 874. The 
plaintiff in that case was a customer in a service station. Upon 
his own initiative, and without any invitation or direction 
from the defendant, he walked through the repair shop look-
ing for an innerliner for a tire. In the language of the Court: 
"As he walked across the shop he stepped over a 
hydraulic hoist, which extended about eight inches 
above the floor, and which was a few feet from the 
grease pit, and continued on toward the tire rack. Upon 
approaching the rack he stopped, his left foot resting 
on or near the rim of the pit. After standing there a 
moment, he shifted his weight from one foot to an-
other, and in doing so, his left foot slipped, he lost 
his balance, and fell into the well." 
The Court assumed, for the purpose of argument, original 
negligence by the defendant and assumed further that plain-
tiff was a business invitee. The Court then held, squarely af-
firming the trial judge, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law. The language of Mr. Justice 
Latimer is quoted for the convenience of the Court: 
"Assuming that the service room was somewhat 
shaded as plaintiff claims, such a circumstance would 
33 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not relieve him from maintammg some reasonable 
lookout along the path he was to travel. Such a con-
dition might require that he be more alert. He was 
el).tering a shop which was used for servicing motor 
vehicles. From his previous experiences and observa-
tions of similar shops . where motor vehicles are serv-
iced, he could reasonably be charged with knowledge 
that some of the equipment in the shop would pre-
sent hazards to one paying no attention to the ob-
stacles across the course to be taken. Furthermore, 
the evidence establishes that he knew. the path he was 
taking was· not free and clear as while proceeding 
across the room toward the rack he stepped over both 
beams of a hydraulic hoist which was in his pathway 
and he maneuvered his way around cans and other 
debris on the ·floor of the shop. In spite of knowing 
the probability of other obstacles blocking his course 
plaintiff continued forward without seeing the cement 
border around the pit, the grease pit, or the ladder 
which was protruding prominently from the pit. The 
hydraulic hoist was located about nine feet from the 
pit, and the grease and oil cans were between the 
hoist and the pit. These obstructions compelled plain-
tiff to pay some heed to the floor of the shop and the 
path he travelled as he crossed the service room in 
order to avoid tripping over them. 
"When he approached the point where he claims 
he could more closely examine the tires on the rack, 
the ladder which extended up from the pit was almost 
within his reach; the cement border was large enough 
to be easily observed; and the merest glance towards 
the floor as he moved forward would have disclosed 
the presence of the danger. It seems unbelievable that 
plaintiff could have been so unobservant as to miss 
seeing the pit as he testified he stood right at its edge 
and upon shifting his weight from one foot to the 
other he lost his balance and fell into the excavation. 
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"Plaintiff seeks to justify his failure to observe the 
danger which was clearly visible because his sole in-
terest was in the tire on the rack;· that he didn't see 
the ladder or the pit because he wasn't looking at 
the floor or wasn't watching where he was stepping 
because his interest was centered solely on the tire 
rack; and that if he had looked he would probably 
have seen the protruding ladder and the pit. It thus 
becomes apparent that this is not a case where plaintiff 
used reasonable care for his own safety. A reasonable 
person makes some observations along the path he 
chooses to follow. In this instance plaintiff was so 
intent upon observing the articles on the rack that he 
neglected to use the care required of a prudent man 
traversing a shop having hazards readily discernable, 
even to one with impaired vision." (Emphasis applied.) 
In the case at bar plaintiff did not even have the excuse 
that the area was shaded, nor did he have the excuse that 
there was a possible defect in his vision. Applying the tests 
of Raymond v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (1948), 113 
Utah 26, 191 P. (2d) 137, it is clear that in any reasonable 
view of the evidence a jury could not find that plaintiff was 
free of contributory negligence. It is respectfully submitted 
that the trial court erred in failing to grant defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict and in failing to enter a judgment of 
non-suit at the close of plaintiff's evidence. 
POINT NO.3 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE. 
The plaintiff attempted to escape the consequences of his 
own negligence by claiming ignorance of his surroundings, 
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and unfamiliarity with those surroundings. The proof showed 
that any ignorance of what was within plain sight was due 
to his unwillingness to look, and his indisposition to take the 
ordinary care that common sense would require a person to 
exercise. Plaintiff's deposition was taken prior to trial, and 
he gave a different version of how some of the events had 
occurred. 
When confronted with his deposition for the purpose of 
showing the admissions of plaintiff that he could have easily 
avoided the accident, counsel for the plaintiff objected to 
reading certain portions to him, and the court sustained the 
objections without knowing the content. Consequently, in the 
absence of the jury, defendant made a proffer of proof to show 
not only some inconsistency, but the admissions of plaintiff 
(R. 170-172): 
"Q. But, as you turned the nozzle away from that 
particular part, you could see whether it was cleaned, 
or needed the fl.pplication of further steam? 
MR. McCARTHY: Your Honor, I object to the 
whole line of questioning, Your Honor, it is repeti-
tion, and not in any way contradictory to anything the 
witness testified to. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MR. REIMANN: Then we would like to make a 
tender of this testimony on the deposition. 
THE COURT: You may make the tender after the 
jury is gone. 
MR. REIMANN: The tender we wish to make is 
page 35 of the deposition of Mr. Rogalski. 
THE COURT: The court, ladies and gentlemen, will 
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be in recess until 2 P.M. (Thereupon the jury is ad-
monished and excused until 2 o'clock P.M.) 
These proceedings were had during the absence of the jury: 
MR. REIMANN: May we make the tender in the 
record? The defendant makes the following tender 
of proof from the deposition of the plaintiff on page 
35, lines 4 to 9 inclusive: 
"Q. But, as you turned the nozzle away from that 
particular part, you could see whether it was cleaned, 
or needed the application of further steam? 
"A. After I took the nozzle away and raised it up in 
the air, I would wait a short while till the steam dis-
appeared, then I could see if I was cleaning it fairly 
good." 
The defendant further tenders proof on page 3 5 of the 
deposition, lines 15 to 26 inclusive: 
"Q. And you had the nozzle and the steam running 
slightly downward, did you not? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. You did not put the hose up so you could see 
where you were going ? 
"A. I had it my my left, and down. I was following 
right along the fender. The fender was right by my hip, 
I cold feel my fender right there. 
"Q. You could have seen rather easily if you had 
turned the steam upwards, turned the nozzle upwards, 
you could have seen the fender without difficulty, could 
you not? 
"A. Yes, I suppose I could have." (Italics added.) 
The defendant also makes a tender of evidence from the 
deposition on page 35, lines 27 to 30: 
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"Q. · You could have seen all of your surroundings, 
too, without difficulty, if you had turned the steam hose 
up instead of turning it down? 
"A. I would probably have had to raise it away over 
my head." 
Each of said tenders is made to show admissions on the 
part of plaintiff, which proximately contributed to his injury, 
each of said tenders so shows. Our proof is further made for 
the purpose of impeaching the plaintiff with respect to answers 
given both on direct examination and on cross-examination. 
MR. McCARTHY: I object to it, it is incompetent, 
irrelevant and immaterial and not proper material for 
impeachment. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
As pointed out in 4 Wigmore on _Evidence, § 1048, pages 
2-6, the admissions made by a patty out of court are admissible 
in evidence. A fortiori, the admissions made under oath are 
likewise admissible. The quoted portions of plaintiff's deposi-
tion show that plaintiff knew that in order to see where he 
was moving, all he had to do was to turn the steam nozzle to 
one side and upward instead of down, inasmuch as he had full 
control of the nozzle and the course and direction of the steam. 
The admissions show conclusively that the condition of lack 
of visibility was created solely by plaintiff, not by defendant. 
Rule 26 (d) permits the deposition of a party to be used by "an 
adverse party for any purpose.'' 
Independent of the proffered evidence, the defendant was 
entitled to have the court grant the motion for a directed ver-
dict of no cause of action. When the court committed the fur-
ther error of submitting the case to the jury, under erroneous 
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instructions, the exclusion of such proffered evidence became 
all the more prejudicial; for the admissions clearly show that 
plaintiff knew how he could have assured himself sufficient 
visibility and that the lack of it depended solely on himself. 
POINT NO.4 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CHARGE TO THE JURY, 
BY ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS AND BY REFUSAL TO 
SUBMIT INSTRUCTIONS ON DEFENDANT'S THEORY. 
It was defendant's theory at the trial of this cause that 
plaintiff had no permission, either express or implied, to use 
the steam cleaning equipment upon the day of the accident. 
Defendant expressly denied any negligence and denied ex-
pressly that plaintiff and his employer were business invitees 
on the premises (R. 16). The evidence supporting defendant's 
theory was to the effect that the agreements between Droubay, 
plaintiff's employer, and defendant was the lease dated March 
1, 1949 and the consignment agreement dated February 25, 
1949 (Exhibits 2 and 8). In neither of these agreements is 
Droubay given any permission to use any portion of Phillips' 
property except the area referred to on Exhibit 1 as "The 
Droubay office" and the area referred to as the "truck pumps." 
Droubay had requested permission to use the steam equipment 
and the wash rack but that he was never given such permission. 
He was "generally just put off." According to his own testi-
mony (R. 86, 87) it was customary, before he ever used the 
rack on previous occasions to inquire of Phillips' maintenance 
foreman whether it would be in use or whether he would be 
in the way, but on the day of the accident he has no 
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recoll~ction of making such inquiry (R. 87). He claimed no 
right to go on to the slab to wash his trucks. His use of the 
equipment was "purely a matter of neighborly accommodation." 
in the instances where the equipment was used. Droubay had 
never offered to pay anyone for the use of the steam cleaning 
equipment. When his trucks were washed elsewhere, or when 
he used other equipment to wash them he was, of course, re-
quired to pay for the service (R. 91, 92). 
Defendant requested the Court to give a series of instruc-
tions, placing before the jury defendant's theory with respect 
to the question of whether plaintiff was a business invitee. De-
fendant's requested Instruction No. 1 was to the effect that 
the jury could find that the plaintiff was a business invitee with 
respect to the area adjacent to the gasoline pumps without 
being an invitee with respect to the area adjacent to the wash 
rack and the wash rack itself. 
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 2 was substantially 
to the same effect. Defendant's requested Instructions Nos. 3, 
4 and 5 were to the effect that if plaintiff and his employer 
were not business invitees the defendant owed them no duty 
to warn plaintiff of a danger of which defendant had no 
knowledge. Defendant's requested Instruction No. 5 incor-
porates the idea ?f an assumption of risk. Defendant's requested 
Instruction No. 6 is a further attempt to enlighten the jury 
concerning the liability toward the business invitee. It includes 
the idea that a "business invitee may extend to one part of 
the premises without extending to all of the premises.'' 
Defendant's requested Instruction No. 7 was as follows: 
"If you find that the plaintiff was merely a licensee upon the 
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premises of the defendant you are instructed that the only 
duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant was not to unlaw-
fully and wantonly injure him. In the absence of such wilful 
and wanton misconduct on the part of the defendant you 
must not allow the plaintiff to recover." Defendant's requested 
Instruction No. 8 was to the effect that plaintiff could not 
have been a business invitee unless he went on the premises 
for a purpose mutually beneficial to plaintiff and defendant, 
and defendant's requested Instruction No. 9 stated: "A pos-
essor of land owes to a gratuitous licensee no duty to inspect 
the land to discover possible or even probable dangers.'' De-
fendant's requested Instruction No. 10 is to the effect that a 
gratuitous licensee is .not entitled to any sP'Xial preparation 
of the premises for his safety. 
Judge Baker uniformly refused to give in substance or 
effect, or at all, defendant's requested Instructions Nos. 1 
through 10. Instead the Court's Instructions 10 and 11 were 
the only enlightenment received by the jury on the difficult 
and technical question of liability of a possessor of land toward 
a business invitee, a gratuitous licensee or a trespasser. Instruc-
tions 10 and 11 by the Court can be searched in vain for any 
distinction in the liability toward these various classes of per-
sons. The entire Instructions only emphasized and reiterated 
the special and particular duty toward a business invitee. The 
Court did not tell the jury in any manner the distinction be-
tween the duty toward a business invitee and a gratuitous 
licensee. 
Unquestionably, there was evidence from which the jury 
could have determined that plaintiff was a gratuitous licensee. 
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In fact, the evidence is conclusive to that effect. The jury 
might even have determined, under the evidence, that at least 
with respect to the day on which the accident occurred plain-
tiff was a trespasser on the wash rack and in the use of the 
steam cleaning equipment. Defendant was entitled to have 
its theory of the case presented to the jury. If the actual re-
quested Instructions of the defendant were inadequate for 
any reason they at least attempted to present defendant's 
theory. The Court's ruling and the Instructions actually given 
took from the jury one of the primary issues in the lawsuit. 
This Court has clearly held that the duty of a trial court to 
instruct the jury on a pertinent theory cannot be avoided be-
cause a request fairly calling the attention of the court to the 
principle of law may also contain some language in addition 
to the statement of the legal principle which may be subject to 
criticism. Smith v. Lenzi, 74 Utah 362, 369, 279 P. 893. The 
duty of the court to adequately instruct the jury on the theory 
of each litigant is so well established in this jurisdiction that 
citation of authority is unnecessary. The duty is not discharged 
by giving mere abstract statements of law. The court itself is 
required to apply the law to the particular facts and to direct 
the jury as to the legal effects of particular facts found by it. 
Smith v. Cannaday, 45 Utah 521, 529, 147 P. 210. 
In the case at bar the trial court refused to discharge this 
duty. It is a fair statement that aside from the question of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law, defendant's main 
theory was that plaintiff was not a business invitee. The special 
duty to discover and disclose defects or dangerous conditions 
was, therefore, inapplicable. The Court could well have ruled 
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that there was no evidence from which the jury could have 
found that plaintiff was a business invitee. Certainly, there 
was evidence to support a finding that plaintiff was a mere li-
censee or even a trespasser. The importance of ample instruc-
tions with respect to liability in each instance is apparent. 
There was ample evidence that plaintiff was not a business 
invitee, and that he was a bare licensee if ·not a trespasser 
with respect to the portion of the premises where the accident 
occurred. The giving of plaintiff's requested instruction No. 4, 
whereby the jury might consider the plaintiff a "business visitor" 
when there was no such evidence, invited a verdict against 
the defendant. The defendant's theory of the evidence was not 
presented, for the court refused to give defendan~· s requested 
instructions numbered 1 to 12; and the court even failed to de-
fine the terms such as "business visitor" and "lic~see," so 
that the jury was left without any guide (R. 228-240). The 
jury was not instructed on defendant's theory at all, with re-
spect to plaintiff being a trespasser or bare licensee. 
As pointed out in Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P. 
2d 114, a party is entitled to have his theory submitted to the 
jury, when there is evidence to sustain it. In Pratt v. Utah 
Light & Traction Co., 57 Utah 7, 169 P. 868, 869, this Honor-
able Court declared: 
"Each party to a suit is entitled to have his theory, 
when there is evidence to sustain it, submitted to the 
jury and the judgment of the jury on the facts tending · 
to support such theory assuming always that there is 
testimony offered to support the same, and this court 
has so held in Hartley v. Salt Lake City, 41 Utah 121, 
124 P. 522, where, speaking through Straup, J., it is 
said: 
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" 'There are two parties to a lawsuit. Each on a sub-
mission of the case to the jury is entitled to a submis-
sion of it on his theory and the law in respect thereof. 
The defendant's theory as to the cause of the accident 
is embodied in the proposed requests. There is some 
evidence, as we have shown, to render them applicable 
to the case. That is not disputed. We think the court's 
refusal to charge substantially as requested was error. 
That the ruling was prejudicial and works a reversal 
of the judgment is self -evident. * * * ' " See also 
Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co., 75 Utah 87, 283 
P. 160." 
If there had been aiiy issue to submit to the jury, the de-
fendant was entitled to have its theory presented in accordance 
with proposed instructions 1 to 12 inclusive, or the substance 
thereof. 
It is respectfully submitted that a trial court's error in giv-
ing and failing to give the instructions with respect to de-
fendant's theory of the case is reversible error and requires 
fendant' s theory of the case is reversible error and would require 
a new trial in the event the cause were not dismissed with 
prejudice. 
POINT NO.5 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND WAS A NECES-
SARY PARTY. 
The defendant filed a motion to the complaint of the 
plaintiff, moving the court to dismiss the action on the grounds 
that the State Insurance Fund was a necessary party plaintiff. 
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This motion was argued and denied by the court. By answer 
the defendant set up the further defense that the cause of 
action, if any, was in the State of Utah, or the State Insurance 
Fund. 
In support of these defenses the defendant offered to 
introduce in evidence in the case from plaintiff as witness, the 
fact that he had received compensation, the amounts of com-
pensation he had received, and the doctor and hospital bills 
that had been paid by the insurance carrier. All of this evi-
dence the court refused to admit. The defendant made a proffer 
of proof in this connection which the court denied (R. 205-
206). 
The date of the accident was January, 1952. The statute 
covering the wrongful act of third persons was 42-1-58 Utah 
Code Ann. ( 1943). This section was a re-enactment of Title 
42-1-58, Chapter 65 of the Session Laws of 1945. 
The 1945 enactment was a complete revision of the section 
covering the death or injury by wrongful act of third persons 
which was in effect at the time the Utah Supreme Court issued 
its decision in the Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co. case, 107 
Utah 114; 152 P. (2d) 98. This decision was issued October 
5, 1944. The 1945 Session Laws re-enacted Sec. 42-1-58, Rev. 
Stat. of Utah 1943o. 
In the Johanson case the court held the cause of action 
of the third party was not assignable under the statutes then 
in effect. The court construed the word "subrogation" in this 
section as not creating any new cause of action. At page 104 
of the Pac. Rep. the court states as follows: 
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"The insured who, because of non-payment of the 
loss in full retains a portion of the right of action, and 
such insurance companies, not only are proper parties 
plaintiff but must be joined as such." 
Again, at page 105, the court states: 
"The only concern of the defendant, third party, is 
that he not be sued twice for the same wrong; that is, 
that the suit be brought in the name of the real party 
in interest and that all persons interested in the liti-
gation be bound by any judgment entered therein. The 
failure on the part of plaintiffs to make the insurance 
carrier a party plaintiff, or· if it refused to join, make 
it a party defendant, is at the most a defect in parties 
plaintiff. Such a defect is waived unless raised." 
The court goes on to point out that the special demurrer 
on the grounds that the plaintiff did not have the capacity to 
sue, did not raise the point of a defect of parties plaintiff. 
The action of the Utah State Legislature in completely 
rewriting the section covering the wrongful act of third per-
sons at the next session of the legislature following the de· 
cision in the J a hanson case must be construed as having had 
for its purpose the enacting of a law which would protect the 
insurance carrier. There must have been some significance 
in changing the word "subrogation" and making the insurance 
carrier who had paid compensation the trustee of the cause 
of action and then providing that the recovery was to be dis-
tributed in accordance with the three items set forth in the 
statute. The first two of the schedules for reimbursement pro-
vide for the payment of all costs of action, including attor-
ney's fees, which is to be charged proportionately against the 
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parties as their interests shall appear; secondly, that the com-
pensation carrier shall be reimbursed in full for all payments 
made, and lastly is the provision that any amount over and 
above shall go to the employee or his heirs. 
This statute in its wording provides that the insurance 
carrier is to bring the action though the action may be in 
the name of the employee or the insurance carrier. This act 
also provides that the insurance carrier can settle and release 
the cause of action but can do so only with the consent of the 
Commission. Clearly, the objection raised by the motion to 
require the Insurance Fund to be joined as a necessary party, 
and the defense that the cause of action was in the insurance 
carrier, are both valid defenses and should have been sustained 
by the court. 
It is no answer that the 1945 amendment ( 41-1-58) pro-
vides that " * * * the employer or insurance carrier shall be-
come trustee of the cause of action against the third party and 
may bring and maintain the action either in its own name or 
in the name of the injured employee * * * ." The action in 
the case at bar was not brought by the insurance carrier in 
the name of the injured employee. It was instead brought by 
the employee himself and in his own right. 
The record in this case is clear that the complaint was 
filed on March 18, 1952 (R. 1-3). Plaintiff sued in his own 
·right without reference to the right of the State Insuqmce 
Fund. On April 2nd (R. 7) defendant filed its motion to dis-
miss and to make more certain in which defendant specifically 
grounded its motion to dismiss on the fact that plaintiff's in-
jury apparently occurred during the course of his employment; 
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that the plaintiff has received compensation" and the insurance 
carrier, be it the State of Utah or otherwise, is therefore a 
necessary party to this action, or the cause of action, if there 
is one, would appear to be in the compensation carrier" (R. 6). 
After this motion was filed a letter was sent by the State 
Insurance Fund to Dennis McCarthy, in which Mr. McCarthy 
was authorized to represent the interest of the State of Utah 
"in attempting to procure reimbursement to the fund for the 
amounts which the State Insurance Fund has been required 
to pay in this case. * * *" ( R. 9) . The letter is dated April 
8, 1952, and was filed on the same date. At no time after this 
fetter was filed was any appearance entered for the State In-
surance Fund. There was never any order of Court to the 
effect, by implication or otherwise, that plaintiff was suing in 
behalf of the Insurance Fund. Certainly the Insurance Fund 
was not maintaining this action and did not maintain the action 
"in the name of the injured employee." The action had been 
filed and defendant's motions served and filed before it ap-
peared to counsel that the State Insurance Fund had an interest 
of any kind. The letter of April 8, 1952, ·was an afterthought, 
and certainly could not add any right to plaintiff which he did 
not have at the time he filed the action. 
It is respectf~lly submitted that, particularly in view 
of the fact that the Court overruled defendant's motions, there 
is nothing in the record in this case to prevent the State Insur-
ance Fund from now maintaining its own separate action 
under the statute, either in its own name or in the name of 
the injured employee. 
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CONCLUSION 
Knox v. Snow, ( 1951), ____ Utah ____ , 229, P. 874, es-
tablishes the principles applicable in this case with respect 
both to negligence and contributory negligence. If anything, 
the sole negligence of plaintiff and lack of any negligence 
on the part of defendant are more appare~t in the case at 
bar than in that case. The Court should reverse the judgment 
and dismiss plaintiffs claims with prejudice. There is no 
question that inasmuch as defendant's theory of the case was 
never presented to the jury by appropriate instructions, and be-
cause the instructions given were erroneous and inadequate, 
defendant would be entitled to a new trial. If a new trial is 
required the Court should order that the State Insurance Fund 
be required to enter an appearance or assign its interest to 
the plaintiff. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY, BURTON, ~1cMILLAN & RICHARDS. and 
PAUL E. REIMANN 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
Received ________________ copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
this ________________ day of June, 195 3. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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